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FIRST AMENDMENT CASES IN THE OCTOBER 2004 TERM
Joel M. Gora*

There were seven First Amendment cases in front of the
Supreme Court this past Term. Four involved speech and association
rights1 and three involved religion issues. 2 In these seven cases, the
First Amendment claim prevailed only twice. 3 First, I will discuss
the First Amendment speech cases and then I will finish up with the
three religion cases.
I.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION

A.

Tory v. Cochran

The first speech case I will discuss is Tory v. Cochran.4

Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Pomona College;
LL.B, Columbia University School of Law. This article is based on a transcript of remarks
from the Seventeenth Annual Supreme Court Review Program presented at Touro Law
Center, Huntington, New York.
1 See Tory v. Cochran, 125 S. Ct. 2108, 2110 (2005); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S.
77, 78 (2004); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2058 (2005); Clingman v.
Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029, 2034-35 (2005).
2 See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005); McCreary County v. ACLU, 125
S. Ct. 2722, 2728 (2005); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005).
3 See Tory, 125 S. Ct. at 2111 (holding that the injunction is an overly broad prior restraint
upon speech because of the trial court's stated reason for granting the injunction could no
longer be met); McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2741 (upholding a preliminary injunction
issued against government display of the Ten Commandments among historically significant
government documents because the government failed to persuade the Court that the display
had a legitimate secular purpose).
4 125 S. Ct. 2108 (2005).

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 21

Professor Chemerinsky argued this classic prior restraint 5 case.6 The
Cochran of Tory v. Cochran was the famous, and late, lawyer Johnnie
Cochran. The clients that Professor Chemerinsky represented were
individuals who had grievances with Mr. Cochran and expressed their
grievances by demonstrating and picketing outside of his office. 7 As
a result of these protests, Mr. Cochran sued the protestors for
defamation. 8 The California court granted a permanent injunction
against any protesting or picketing of a similar nature targeting Mr.
Cochran. 9

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the issue of
whether the injunction against engaging in defamatory speech
constituted a prior restraint of speech.10 During the pendency of the
argument, Mr. Cochran passed away and his wife was substituted as a
party.'"

There was an issue of whether the death of Mr. Cochran

mooted the case. The Court, in a short opinion by Justice Stephen

5 Id.; see Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 554 n.2 (1993), which noted that the
doctrine of prior restraint has roots in the 16th and 17th-century English system of
censorship. American jurisprudence recognizes prior restraints as governmental censorship
of content before publication and particularly in the form of the government licenses for
printing presses and judicial injunctions against future speech. Id. See also Michael I.
Meyerson, RewritingNear v. Minnesota: Creating a Complete Definition of PriorRestraint,
52 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1136 (2001) ("The most common case in which the ban on prior
restraint protects 'unprotected' speech is the prohibition on enjoining defamatory statements.
Despite the arguments of those who assert the equitable limitation on injunctive relief is
outdated, the constitutional prohibition has prevented injunctive relief from being awarded to
successful defamation plaintiffs.").
6 Duke Law School - Erwin Chemerinsky biography, http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/
chemerinsky (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).
7 Tory, 125 S. Ct. at 2110.
8 Id.
9 Id.
1o Id. ("Whether a permanent injunction as a remedy in a defamation action, preventing all
future speech about an admitted public figure, violates the First Amendment.").
I1 Id.
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Breyer, held that the case was not moot because the injunction was
still operative on the speakers, and thus the Court could read the
merits of the case.' 2 However, with the death of Mr. Cochran, the
underlying concern that there would be an effort to coerce Mr.
Cochran, was no longer present.1 3 Therefore, it was argued that on
its face the sweeping nature of the injunction was overbroad in
relation to Mr. Cochran's arguable interest.' 4 Overbroad injunctions
against speech are one of the few things that you can guarantee will
violate the First Amendment,' 5 and as expected, the Court held that
the

injunction was overbroad

Amendment.'

6

and a violation

of the First

Specifically, the Court found that the sweeping

nature of the injunction was sufficient to render it facially
unconstitutional, which invoked some great prior restraint language
from cases where the Court struck down injunctions against speech. 7
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the California courts for
further proceeding.' 8 This case was an important reminder that since
the early days of the First Amendment, one of its main theoretical

Tory, 125 S. Ct. at2110-11.
13Id. at 2111.
14 Id.
12

15 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (stating that in
examining injunctions that restrict speech, the Court follows those principles that assure an
injunction is "no broader than necessary to achieve its desired goals"); M.I.C., Ltd. v.
Bedford Twp., 463 U.S. 1341, 1343 (1983) (staying the trial court's "broad proscription"

that bars showing films before a final judgment has been rendered on whether the films
indeed qualify as obscene); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 236, 242 (6th Cir. 1975)

(ordering the trial judge to vacate an order that prohibited parties, counsel, close friends and
associates from discussing with the media the litigation "in any manner whatsoever" as
overly broad).

16 Tory, 125S. Ct. at2111.
17 id.
18 Id.
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missions was to prevent the government from prohibiting speech
before it occured through the issuance of injunctive orders.' 9
B.

San Diego v. Roe

The next First Amendment case before the Supreme Court
last Term was San Diego v. Roe. 20 Here, a police officer in the San
Diego Police Department made some videos where he was taped
stripping out of a police uniform and engaging in a unilateral sexual
activity. 2'

He sold the videos on eBay along with some police

memorabilia,

none

of which were

actually

issued by

the

department. 22 One of his superiors found out about these items and
initiated a proceeding to dismiss the officer from the department.23
The officer was dismissed for conduct unbecoming an officer, and I
guess also for being out of uniform.24
When the Roe case went up to the Ninth Circuit, the court
ruled in favor of the former police officer.25 A free speech decision
by the Ninth Circuit is almost always a prima facie case for Supreme
Court review.26 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and

19 Alexander, 509 U.S. at 553-54 n.2 (noting that injunctions against future speech are
disfavored).

20 543 U.S. 77 (2004).
2 Id. at 78.

22 Id. (noting that plaintiff also sold underwear and a video of him engaging in a unilateral
sexual act); Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 543
U.S. 77 (2004).
23 Roe, 543 U.S. at 78-79.
24 Id. at 79.
25 Id. at 78.

26 See Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 37 (1999)
(reversing a Ninth Circuit decision to enjoin the enforcement of a California statute that
restricted the dissemination of arrestee's address because the statute violated the First
Amendment).
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ruled in favor of the police department on two grounds.27 First, in
past decisions, the Court reasoned that public workers are still
citizens and can pursue speech efforts off duty as long as they do not
impact their work.28 However, in Roe the officer's activity was not
constitutionally protected.

The Court reasoned that because the

videos involved police insignia and police identity, the officer's
activities were not off duty because they were not unrelated to his
work.29

Therefore, the Court held that the officer could not take

advantage of the line of cases which have held that off duty activities
are constitutionally protected.30
Next, Roe's other argument relied on Pickering v. Board of
Education,31 an important case decided in the late 1960s.32 Pickering
held that a government employee has a right to comment about things
related to the employee's area of expertise, such as writing a letter to
the newspaper about department policies. Similarly, Roe argued that
he was speaking out on issues related to his employment and was
therefore entitled to take advantage of the Pickeringdecision.33 The
Court said that before it engages in a balancing of the officer's rights
against the department's concerns, the predicate for the Pickering
rule is that the employee was off duty, on his or her own time, and
was commenting on a matter of public concern.34 Only after this is

27 Roe, 543 U.S. at 80.
28 Id.

29 Id. at 81.
3 Id. at 80-82.
31 Id. at 81-82. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
32 Pickering,391 U.S. at 565-69.
33 Roe, 543 U.S. at 79.
34 Id. at 82-83 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).

854
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established, could the Court decide whether the commentary hinders
the working relationship. 35 The Court held that in this case, there
was no commentary on a matter of public concern. 36 This was just a
sexual presentation, and so the officer in Roe could not rely on the
Court's precedent that public employees have the right to comment
on matters of public concern. 37
The Roe decision was a strong per curiam decision on the
question of employee rights, which reaffirmed the principles, set
forth in Pickering.

However, when the Court applied those

principles, it resulted in sustaining the dismissal of an employee. 38
Perhaps, not surprisingly, Roe was the first case where the First
Amendment claimant did not prevail.
C.

Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association

The next speech case is Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association.39 This case involved the Beef Promotion Research Act,
which announced a federal policy of promoting the marketing and
consumption of beef and beef products. 40

The Act imposed an

assessment or "checkoff," on all sales and importation of cattle. 4 1 A
committee, set up by the government to promote the sale of beef,
spent

the

assessment

imposed by the Act

on promotional

35 id.
36 Id. at 84.
" Id. at 84-85.

38 Roe, 543 U.S. at 79, 85.
39 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005).
40 Id. at 2058. The statute also establishes a "Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Research

Board." Id.
41 Id. A one-dollar per-head assessment was imposed. Id.
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advertisements.4 2 The problem was that the government required the
promotional subsidy to be supported by members of the industry
supposedly being benefited by the advertisements.43

The dissenting

members of the industry did not think they were being benefited and
therefore did not want to support the ads. 44 Thus, they filed suit,
invoking what was at this point the well-settled First Amendment
doctrines that in certain circumstances, the government cannot
compel speech nor can the government compel one to subsidize
speech of others with whom one might disagree.45
The

first

case

that

held

compelled

speech

to

be

unconstitutional was West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, which came out of the World War II context of refusing to
salute the flag in school.4 6 The Court in Barnette reasoned that an
individual is protected in refusing to honor the flag if saluting the flag
was against the individual's religious or other beliefs. 47

The

Supreme Court held that an individual had a constitutional right not
to be compelled to speak when such speech was against that person's
belief.48 Some thirty years later, the Court applied this principle in

Id. at 2059. In addition to the promotions, the assessments were used to fund food
research and provide informational campaigns for the benefit of both consumers and
producers. Id.
43 Id. The advertisements included, "Beef. It's What's for Dinner." Id.
44 Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2064.
45 Id. at 2059 (referring to the Court's holding in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533
U.S. 405 (2001)).
46 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1943). The children
who refused to salute the flag were expelled from school and their parents were prosecuted
for causing "delinquency." Id. at 630.
47 Id. at 634-35. The appellees in this case were Jehovah's Witnesses who teach, "that the
obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal
government." Id. at 629.
41 Id. at 642.
42
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Wooley v. Maynard, and held that the State of New Hampshire could
not enforce criminal sanctions against a couple who refused to
display the state motto, "Live Free or Die" on their license plate.49
The Supreme Court explained that an individual has a right not to be
compelled by the state to have a message displayed on their car when
that message is offensive to that particular person. 50
The other issue addressed in Johanns was whether subsidized
government speech was contrary to the First Amendment.

There

have been cases where public employees were required to contribute
to the bargaining agent for, among other things,

supporting or

opposing an array of state legislation. 5 The Supreme Court held that
you have a right not to be taxed for that speech through another
52
organization with which you do not agree.
The cattlemen in Johanns attempted to invoke these principles
but were unsuccessful.53 I think the reason is twofold. First, there
was some indication in the Johanns opinion that the Court is
hospitable to government

efforts

to support these types of

promotional efforts by the government, which seeks to promote sales
49 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). Jehovah's Witnesses, George and Maxine
Maynard, asserted that the New Hampshire State motto was "repugnant to their moral,
religious, and political beliefs," and therefore refused to display it on their automobiles. Id.
at 707.
50 Id. at 715.
The court examined two points which included the Maynard's First
Amendment protections and the State's countervailing interest in compelling the Maynard's
to display "Live Free or Die" on their license plates. Id. at 715-16.
5' See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 6-14 (1990) (holding that compulsory dues
violated the First Amendment right when such dues were not necessarily used to improve the
legal profession); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) (holding that
the Constitution did not require that political and ideological causes be financed through
such assessments).
52 Keller, 496 U.S. 15-17;Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36.
53 Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2065 ("Since neither the Beef Act nor the Beef Order requires
attribution, neither can be the cause of any possible First Amendment harm.").
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for the agricultural industry. The Court had a couple of previous
cases involving agricultural and food product industry advertising
mandated by the federal government.54

The Court upheld one

program involving fruits and vegetables,55 while striking down
another program involving a different kind of agricultural product.56
Second, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Johanns,
said that this was not a compelled speech case because the dissenting
members of the association were not personally being compelled to
utter the words.57

The speech being subsidized was government

speech, not the speech of the association.58

The purpose of the

advertisements was to further a government policy to promote this
kind of food product, and therefore the association's argument was
really that they had the right not to subsidize government speech.59
The problem with this argument was that if you have a right not to
subsidize government speech, you have a right not to pay your taxes
and to say to the federal government I'm not paying for it because I
don't like it. The Court rejected this argument and stated that First
Amendment rights yield to the government's right to tax people and
institutions and use the tax proceeds to support the government's
activities, including the speech that the government utters or requires

54 See United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott
Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
55 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 469-74 (holding that required assessments for product
advertising did not violate the First Amendment rights of the tree fruit producers).
56 United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 415-16 (2001) (holding that mandatory contributions
for generic mushroom advertising were not part of a "broader regulatory scheme" and
therefore violated the First Amendment).
57 Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2063.
58 Id.

51 Id. at 2062.
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its agents to utter as part of the government's activities. 60 The Court,
in rejecting the compelled speech argument, focused on the fact that
this was government speech that was being subsidized, not private
speech. 6 '
There were two concurring opinions.

Justices Breyer and

Ginsburg both focused on the fact that this was merely economic
regulation, and as economic regulation it does not invoke the kind of
heightened scrutiny and sensitivity, which is the hallmark of First
Amendment analysis.62

Justices Souter, Stevens, and Kennedy

dissented.63 They took the stronger First Amendment position that
these were private individuals who were being forced to subsidize
speech that would benefit other private individuals and therefore this
could not be easily dispatched as a government speech case. 64
D.

Clingman v. Beaver

So far, we have discussed three First Amendment cases before
66
65
the Court last Term, of which there was one win and two losses
for the First Amendment. But the final loss in the free speech and

60 Id. at 2063 ("Citizens may challenge compelled support of private speech, but have no
First Amendment right not to fund government speech. And that is no less true when the
funding is achieved through targeted assessments devoted exclusively to the program to
which the assessed citizens object.").
61 Id. at 2062-63.

62 Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2067 (Breyer, J., concurring); Id. at 2067-68 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
63 Id. at 2068 (Kennedy, Souter, JJ., dissenting).
64 Id. at 2069-75 (including Thomas Jefferson's quote: "to compel a man to furnish
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and
tyrannical").
65 See Tory, 125 S. Ct. 2108.
66 See Roe, 543 U.S. at 77; Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2055.

859
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association area was in Clingman v. Beaver,67 a case involving the
government regulation of political parties, and particularly the ability
of political parties to open their primary elections to non-members of
that party.68
About twenty years ago in a case called Tashjian v.
Connecticut, the Supreme Court seemed to hold that Connecticut
could not prevent Republicans, who wanted to expand their base,
from inviting Independents to vote and participate in the Republican
primary. 69 The Court held that a law that mandated a closed primary,
meaning

closed

to

anybody

but Republicans,

violated

the

Republicans' rights of speech and association because it denied
Republicans the right to associate with Independents through their
* 70
primary.

However, in CaliforniaDemocratic Party v. Jones, 71 decided
in 2000, the Court held the opposite.

California mandated that

anybody, Independents included, could vote in any primary.72 The
Republicans and Democrats objected, stating that they wanted to
have their own members and define their own identity. They were
afraid that if they were required to include members of other parties
in their primary election, they might have a watered down identity. 7
The Supreme Court agreed, concluding that the parties had the right

67 125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005).
68 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).

Id. at 210-I1.
Id. at 215,225.
71 Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
72 Id. at 570.
69

70

71 Id.

at 571.

860
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to not only include whomever they wanted but also to exclude
whomever they wanted, even if this includes those who are not
74

members of the party.

Along came Clingman v. Beaver.75

Clingman came out of

Oklahoma. Oklahoma had a semi-closed primary system, which only
permitted members of that party and Independents to participate.76
The Libertarian party in Oklahoma decided that they would welcome
anybody to vote in its primary election, regardless of party
affiliation.77

The case went up to the Supreme Court, where the

Libertarians argued the Oklahoma semi-closed primary system
violated their First Amendment rights to association.78 The Supreme
Court, in a six-to-three decision rejected that claim.79
Justice Thomas wrote the Clingman opinion and said that
while the Court has given strong protection to political parties, as
embodying freedom of association, and has given protection against
laws that regulate the parties' internal processes, or the ability of the
party to communicate these views to the public, this is not such a
case. 80 The Court concluded that since this restriction in Clingman
did not involve the core concerns that motivated the Court to give
strong protection to the rights of political parties, the scrutiny to

74 Id. at 586.

71 125 S. Ct. at 2029.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78

Id. at 2038 ("According to respondents, the burden imposed by Oklahoma's semi-

closed primary system is no less severe than the burden at issue in Tashjian, and hence we
must apply strict scrutiny as we did in Tashjian.").
79 Id. at 2029 (Stevens, Ginsberg & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
8o Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2036. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. 208; Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
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which the measure was subject was less than strict scrutiny. 8'
In Clingman, the Court evaluated whether there were
important interests that were furthered by the semi-closed primary
system. The Court found that there were three regulatory interests
that

were

restrictions.

"enough
82

to justify

reasonable,

nondiscriminatory

First, the system helped to preserve the identity of

parties, which would ensure that the election would reflect the voting
of the party's own members.83 Second, the system would retain "the
importance of party affiliation," and would aid in party electioneering
and party-building efforts. 84

Finally, the system helped parties

operate better and ensured confidence that their own membership
would be choosing the parties' nominees and would protect parties
against being raided by calculating members of other parties.85 The
Court concluded that because the semi-closed primary system
furthered the state's interests, and since strict scrutiny was not being
called for, the law would be sustained. 86
The dissenters said this really is about political protectionism
and protecting parties against good, healthy competition.87

If the

Libertarians wanted competition, the First Amendment should let
them have it, rather than let the state decide who can associate with
the Libertarian party during an election. 88

81 Clingman, 125 S. Ct at 2038.
82 Id. at 2039.

83 Id.
84 Id. at 2040.
85

Id. at 2039-41.

86 Clingman, 125 S.Ct. at 2041-42.
87 Id. at 2054 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 2054-55.

862
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RELIGION AND ESTABLISHMENT

The final cases that I want to discuss are the Court's religion
cases. The two most prominent ones are the ones involving the Ten
Commandments. First is the Texas case, Van Orden v. Perry, which
Professor Chemerinsky argued. 89 In that case, the Court sustained
the display of the Ten Commandments.9" The second case before the
Court last Term was the Kentucky case, McCreary County, Kentucky
v. ACLU. 9 ' Here, the Court struck down the display of the Ten
Commandments.

92

Generally, the

issue before

the Court in these Ten

Commandments cases was under what circumstances and in what
settings can a government display content, such as the Ten
Commandments, and not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. As
we all know the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make
no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. 93 Accordingly, there
are two sides of the coin: the government can't support religion and
the government can't penalize religion. 94 If the government seems to
be supporting, subsidizing, encouraging, or endorsing religion or
religious content, then that would be a problem under the
Establishment Clause. 95 On the other hand, where government is
simply acknowledging the presence of religion in our lives, then
89

Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).

90 Id.

91 McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
92 id.
93 U.S. CONST. amend. I, which states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ......

94 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2859.
95 Id.
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96
perhaps that is not prohibited by the Establishment Clause.

Government is supposed to be neutral when it comes to religion.
This issue is the subject of an ongoing debate among the Supreme
Court Justices. 97 I think the modem view is that the government
must be neutral.

But there is another point of view that says the

government can favor certain religious points of view, as long as it
does not pick and choose among them or coerce belief by those who
dissent. These different interpretations of the Establishment Clause
made it difficult to foresee how the Supreme Court was going to
come out on these Ten Commandments cases.
A.

McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU

McCreary County was a five-to-four decision, which struck
down the presentation of the Ten Commandments. 98

I think the

reason the display in McCreary County was struck down has to do
with the long history of attempts by the legislature to have the display
pass muster under the First Amendment.

When the display was

originally posted in the courthouses, there was a religious suggestion
made in the initiating resolutions of the county. 99 After suit was
filed, the display took a separate form. 100

Other documents were

added, but the religious portions of the other documents were

96

Id. at 2861-62.

9' Id. at
98

2860-61.

McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2729, 2732.

Id. at 2728-29.
l0 Id. at 2727 ("After suits were filed ... the legislative body of each county adopted a
99

resolution calling for a more extensive exhibit meant to show that the Commandments are
Kentucky's 'precedent legal code.' ") (citation omitted).
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highlighted.' O' At that point, the county changed counsel and the
display evolved into a third incarnation called "Foundations of
American Law and Government Display," which now included both
the Magna Carta and the Ten Commandments.
purpose of this display? 10 3

0

2

What was the

Was it for the secular purpose of

addressing the role of religion in the relationship between people and
government, or was the purpose religious whereby the government
supported the Ten Commandments as an official government
document?

04

The Court held in a five-to-four decision that the purpose of
the display was religious.'05 Looking at the origins of the placement
of the Ten Commandments and then at the history of the display in
the county, the Court held that the original purpose of the
presentation of the Ten Commandments was religious. 10 6

That

purpose had not dissipated during the course of the litigation, even up
to the point of where the display was renamed "The Foundations of
American Law and Government."'' 0 7 It was not clear whether the
display started out with other documents including the Ten
Commandments, it would have been acceptable and viewed as not
having a sectarian or religious purpose. However, the Court could
not ignore the history of this particular presentation or divorce the

10 Id.at 2729.
102

Id. at 2730-31, 2739-40.

103 McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2731.
'04Id. at 2731-32.

'05 Id. at 2722 (Scalia, Rehnquist, Thomas & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
106 Id. at 2731.
107 Id. at 2731-32.
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past from the present.' l 8

865

And in light of the display's history, the

determination was that the purpose was religious. 109
In reaching the conclusion that the posting of the Ten
Commandments violated the First Amendment, the Court was guided
by its decision in Stone v. Graham, a case decided twenty-five years
earlier." 1 In Stone v. Graham, the Court struck down the mandatory
placement of the Ten Commandments in all schools in the state of
Kentucky."1' The Court held that in light of the special concern of
not wanting to indoctrinate young people together with the religious
nature of the Ten Commandments, the mandatory display of the Ten
Commandments in all schools in the state would indicate "official
support of the State" for a particular religion, which violated the
Establishment Clause.

12

While a school environment is a different

context from a courthouse, the McCreary County Court nonetheless
was guided by the Stone decision, finding that the religious purpose
of the display, similar to the display in Stone, was sufficient to strike
it down.

3

There were

four conservative

dissenters in McCreary

County. "s' The dissenters believed that the nature of the display did

108 McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2731.
109

Id.

110 Id. at 2732, 2737.
't

Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1981).

112 Id. at 41-42 (holding that the display failed the first part of the Lemon test, which

required that there be a secular legislative purpose supporting the display and in light of the
school's failure to integrate the Ten Commandments into the school's curriculum, and the
"plainly religious" nature of the Ten Commandments, the display violated the first part of
the Lemon Test and the Establishment Clause of the Constitution).
113

McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2737, 2745.

114 Id. at 2748 (Scalia, Rehnquist, Thomas & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).

866
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not cross what they thought was the proper line between permitted
1 15
neutrality and the excessive government support of religion.
B.

Van Orden v. Perry

The other Ten Commandments case before the Supreme
Court last Term was Van Orden v. Perry." 6

In this case, the

Supreme Court upheld the placement of a Ten Commandments
display."

7

This case involved

the placement

of the Ten

Commandments on a monument in front of the Texas State Capitol,
which contained

seventeen other monuments and twenty-one

historical markers. " 8 What was different about this case was Justice
Breyer. He became the Justice O'Connor, namely the swing vote,
because

he

had

gone

along

with

striking

down

the Ten

Commandments as presented in the Kentucky courthouse case, but
upheld the presentation of the Ten Commandments as it appeared in
the Texas Capitol."

9

Justice Breyer and the conservative

Justices felt that

displaying the Ten Commandments in this fashion was a permissible
government acknowledgment of religion. 20

They felt that the

115 Id. at 2750. Justice Scalia wrote for the dissent and argued that the First Amendment

does not mandate absolute neutrality between government and religion. Id. at 2750 ("[H]ow
can the Court possibly assert that the First Amendment mandates government neutrality
between religion and nonreligion and that manifesting a purpose to favor adherence to
religion generally, is unconstitutional? Who says so? Surely not the words of the
Constitution. Surely not the history and traditions that reflect our society's constant
understanding of those words. Surely not even the current sense of our society .
)
(citations omitted).
116 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
l17 Id. at 2854, 2859 (2005).
118

Id. at2858.

119 Id. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring).
120

Id. at 2864 (plurality opinion).
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government does not have to be strictly neutral where religion was
concerned. 1 2' The liberal Justices, namely Justices Stevens, Souter
and Ginsburg along with Justice O'Connor, dissented on the grounds
that this was too much government support of religion and that the
text in this display was too sectarian. 122 According to the dissenters,
the result of allowing religious displays with the public support
would not advance religion, but would cause divisiveness among
23
religions and between believers and nonbelievers. 1
With these powerful doctrinal and human forces on either
side, why did Justice Breyer think that this display was permissible
whereas the Kentucky display was not? I think the answer, as I said
before, could be context. According to Justice Breyer, the context in
Van Orden was different because the display appeared in an open
park setting, rather than an enclosed building. 124 Second, the display
in Van Orden contained a wide variety of other forms of expression,
documents, and monuments that dissipated the religious nature of the
Ten Commandments. 1 25

Furthermore, Justice Breyer made an

analogy to adverse possession and pointed out that the display had
been on the Texas State Capitol grounds for forty years and nobody
complained until now. 126

This was convincing evidence that the

display did not prove to be divisive and was not an obvious
121 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863 ("Simply having religious content or promoting a

message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment
Clause.").
122 Id. at 2873 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); id. at 2891 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
id. at 2892 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).

Id. at 2881-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124Id. at 2870 (Breyer, J., concurring).
123

125 Id.
126

Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2870-71.
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compromise of the government's required neutrality. 127
Finally, Justice Breyer cautioned that if the Court reached a
contrary conclusion in Van Orden based upon the mere religious
nature of a display, countless displays would be struck down. This,
Justice Breyer feared, would lead to an implied hostility towards
religion. 128

In turn, this would bring about religious strife and

warfare -

an outcome, which the establishment and free exercise
clauses sought to prevent. 129
C.

Cutter v. Wilkinson

30
The last religion case I will discuss is Cutter v. Wilkinson.'

This case invoked the argument that giving statutory protection to the
13 1
religious needs of prisoners violated the Establishment Clause.
Prison officials argued that Congress violated the Establishment
Clause when they gave some protection to the religious concerns of
prisoners. 132 The ACLU was on the other side of the Establishment
Clause argument, claiming that Congress, in fact, had not violated the
Establishment Clause. 133
The history of Cutter goes back to 1990 with the Supreme
Court decision, Employment Division v. Smith. 134 The Court in Smith

127 Id.

128 Id. at 2873 ("[T]o reach a contrary conclusion here, based primarily upon on [sic] the
religious nature of the tablets' text would, I fear, lead the law to exhibit a hostility toward
religion that has no place in our Establishment Clause traditions.").
129 Id. at 2871.
125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005).
131 Id. at 2116-17 (2005).
132 Id. at2117.
130

IId. at2116.

114494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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dealt with a claim that the First Amendment protected the religious
use of peyote by a municipal worker in Oregon.1 35 The Supreme
Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not immunize
individuals from generally applicable criminal laws and that
regardless of the Oregon law's unintended effect of inhibiting
Smith's exercise of his religion, the law was not a violation of the
36

First Amendment. 1

Congress, unhappy with the outcome in Smith, passed
controversial legislation, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA), stating that whenever any government, federal, state,
or local official interferes with the exercise of religion, the
government must satisfy a compelling interest standard justifying
37
such interference. 1

The Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores said that
Congress did not have the constitutional authority to pass the
RFRA. 138

The Court reminded Congress of the well-settled

precedent of Marbury v. Madison, which stated that it is the duty of
the judicial branch to interpret the Constitution and to decide what
39
level of scrutiny is required when evaluating legislative action.
Not to be outdone, Congress took its turn again and passed the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person's Act,

40

which

135 Id. at 872, 874.

Id. at 878-79.
137 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
138City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (holding that the legislature's
136

powers are defined and limited based on the constitution).
139 Id. at 535-36. "Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is best preserved
when each part of the government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and
determinations of the other branches." Id. at 536.
140Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc et
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basically says the same thing as the RFRA, but limited the legislation
to two categories of cases: zoning cases involving churches, and
141
religious practice cases involving prisoners.
In Cutter v. Wilkinson, Ohio resisted claims of certain inmates
who were subscribers to "off-brand religions," and when asked to
justify the restrictions of the prisoner's religious claims by reference
to a compelling state interest, refused, arguing that Congress could
not protect religion this way because it violated the Establishment
Clause. 142 The Supreme Court rejected the state's argument and held
that there was no violation of the Establishment Clause and that
unlike the RFRA, this was tailored legislation as it only dealt with
two specific areas. 143 Furthermore, the Court stated that prisoners
were already disadvantaged where their religious practices were
concerned, and therefore this statute does not bestow an advantage on
a particular group, but rather brought the prisoners up to par with
44
other un-disadvantaged groups. 1
Specifically, the statute stated that if a prisoner had a religious
requirement or need and requested that of a prison official, the prison
official must have a good reason for denying the prisoner's
request. 145 The rationale behind the legislation was that because
these people are in prison, it is hard for them to practice their

seq. (2000).
141 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc; Saints Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v.
City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting Greek church challenged
denial of zoning application by city council); Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2118.
142 Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2117, 2120.
143 Id. at 2117, 2121.
144 Id. at 2122.
141 Id. at 2122-23.
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religion; therefore, there should be some flexibility in seeking
46

accommodations. 1

Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Court and pointed
out that the statute also takes into account the prison needs of order
and discipline.' 47 On balance, the Court concluded unanimously that
even though this is a statute that gives additional protection to
religious claimants in a state and local government setting, it is
protection that is reasonable. 148 In other words, the statute did not
provide extra protection to the prisoners; it only returned the
prisoners to a level playing field when it came to practicing their
49

religion. 1

146

Id. at 2122.

141 Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2123 (noting that lawmakers were aware of the importance of

safety and security in penal institutions).
148 Id. at 2121 (adding that the provision is both permissible and compatible with the
Constitution).
149 Id. at 2122 (concluding that institutionalized persons rely upon the government for the
freedom to exercise religion).

